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ABSTRACT
Most reliability analysis techniques and tools assume that a system is used for a mission consisting of a
single phase. However, multiple phases are natural in many missions. The failure rates of components, system
configuration, and success criteria may vary from phase to phase. In addition, the duration of a phase may be
deterministic or random. Recently, several researchers have addressed the problem of reliability analysis of
such systems using a variety of methods. We describe a new technique for phased-mission system reliability
analysis based on Boolean algebraic methods. Our technique is computationally efficient and is applicable
to a large class of systems for which the failure criterion in each phase can be expressed as a fault tree (or
an equivalent representation). Our technique avoids state space explosion that commonly plague Markov
chain-based analysis. We develop a phase algebra to account for the effects of variable configurations and
success criteria from phase to phase. Our technique yields exact (as opposed to approximate) results. We
demonstrate the use our technique by means of an example and present numerical results to show the effects
of mission phases on the system reliability.
1This research was supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under NASA C,ontract No. NASI-
19480 while the authors were ill residence at the [nstitute for ('_omputer Applications ill Science and Engineering (ICASE),
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681.

1 Introduction
The reliability analysis of ultra-reliable computer systems is an important problem for which various tech-
niques and tools have been developed [1]-[4]. Most analysis techniques assume that the systems operate in
single-phase missions. However, multiple phases are natural in many applications. The system configuration,
operational requirements for individual components, the success criteria, and the stress on the components
(and thus the failure rates) may vary from phase to phase. For example, fault tolerant systems may consist of
multiple subsystems employing redundancy and may have dedicated or pooled spares. A dedicated spare can
replace only a single preassigned function. A pooled spare, on the other hand, has the capability of replacing
any of the several functions in the system. Depending on the requirements during different phases, spares
may be placed in service or removed from service to balance the system reliability and the cost of operation.
The success of a redundancy management scheme defines if a system is operational or not. The usage of
subsystems may also vary from phase to phase and subsystems supporting those services may remain idle
or may be switched off. Furthermore, the duration of any phase may be deterministic or random. All these
variations affect the system reliability.
Sometimes the effects of phased missions can be ignored in favor of simpler analysis. For example, in an
airplane system, landing gear and its associated control subsystems are not required during cruising phase.
So exact analysis should not ignore such failures. But, continuing to count the failure of landing gear during
cruising phase has very little impact on the overall unreliability and may simplify the computation. However,
most of the time only conservative estimates can be made, thus yielding the worst case unreliability of the
system. One adverse effect of this is that the systems are over-designed. For economic reasons, it may be
desirable to perform more accurate analysis. In particular, if one phase may see much more stress than others
then it is necessary to account for these effects properly. It is not accurate to use conservative parameters for
the the entire mission. On the other hand the impact of a phase with severest parameter values must not be
ignored in analysis. Different aspects of phased-mission systems have been discussed by several researchers.
A B C
Figure 1: The three units in a system
To describe and compare the work here of others and our own, we will use a three component system as
an example. Components A, B, and C are used in a system which is employed in a mission with 3 phases.
The phases are denoted as Phase X, Phase Y, and Phase Z, respectively. To show the effect of phased-mission
analysis we will consider all six permutation of these three phases. That is, we will assume that the mission
may go through the three phases in any order. So one particular order may he Phases X, Y, and Z or another
Am
A
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Figure 2: The success criteria for phases expressed using fault trees
could be Phases Z, Y, and X. The success criteria for each of the three phases is expressed using fault trees
as shown in Figure 2. In Phase X, the system fails if any of the components A, B, or C fails. In Phase Y,
the system fails if component A fails or both of the components B and C fail. In Phase Z, the system fails
if all three components fail. The failure rates of three components are Aa, Ab, and Ac, respectively.
The corresponding Markov chains for all phases are shown in Figure 3. In the Markov chain representa-
tion, a 3-tuple represents a state indicating the status of the three components respectively. A "1" represents
that the corresponding component is alive and a "0" represent that the component has failed. For example,
a state (101) implies that component B has failed and the other two components are alive. A transition from
one state to another state has a rate associated with it which is the failure rate of the component that fails.
For example, a transition from state (011) to state (010) has a transition rate of Ac. States marked F are
failed states.
2 Related Work
Esary and Ziehms [5] discuss analysis of multiple configuration systems during different phases of a mission to
accomplish specified goals. In their approach, each phase of a system is modeled using a separate reliability
block diagram (RBD). For phase p, a component C is represented by a series of a blocks cl, c2,..., cp where
ci represents the probability of failure (or success) associated with component C in a phase i and depends
on the failure rate of that component during that phase. All phase RBDs are connected in series as shown
in Figure 4 for a three phase system using three components. Solution of this RBD correctly predicts the
reliability of the three phase system. The problem with this approach is a large RBD with several common
events, the solution of which may be computationally very expensive. Each component generates p basic
event for a p-phased system. A k component system will thus have k • p basic events and obtaining cut
F F
Markov Chain for Phase X
Markov Chin for Phase Y
MarkovChain for PhaseZ
Figure 3: The Markov chains for three phases
PHASE X PHASE Y PHASE Z
Figure 4: Reliability block diagram for a three phases system with variable configuration
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Markov Chains for Phases X, Y, and Z and mapping between them
Figure 5: The multi-phase Markov chain
sets after accounting for common events will be expensive. Approximate solution to RBD may include large
errors due to multiple common events.
Pedar and Sarma [6] carry out phased-mission analysis of an aerospace computing systems using an
approach similar to Esary and Ziehms. They developed a procedure to systematically cancel out the common
events in earlier phases which are accounted for in later phases. Alam and AI-Saggaf [7] developed a technique
to analyze repairable systems in which system success criteria and failure rates of components may vary from
phase to phase.
Smotherman and Zemoudeh [9] use a non-homogeneous Markov model to carry out a phased-mission
system analysis. They represent the behavior of the system in each phase using a different Markov chain
and each phase is represented by a separate subset of the states. The state transitions, which are described
in terms of random variables, are generalized to include phase changes. Therefore, state dependent phase
changes, random phase durations, time varying failure and repair behavior are readily modeled. A complete
Markov chain of a three phase system of Figure 2 with phase order of X, Y, and Z is shown in Figure 5. The
major drawback of this approach, like Esary and Ziehms approach using RBDs, is a huge non-homogeneous
Markov chain. The size of the state space is as big as the sum of the number of states in each of the individual
phase. This requires large amount of storage and computation time to solve a system limiting the kind of
systems that can be analyzed.
Somani et. al. [10] presented a computationally efficient method to analyze multi-phased systems and a
new software tool for reliability analyses of such systems. A system with variable configuration and success
criteria results in different Markov chains for different phases as shown in Figure 5. In Somani et. al.'s
approach, instead of a single Markov chain, Markov chains for individual phases are developed and solved
separately. The issue of varying success criteria and change in system configuration from phase to phase
F(1.2.3') F(I,2o3') F(2,.3) I'(2.3)
F(I,2,3)
(a) Markov Chain for Phase X, Y, and Z (b) Markov Chain for Phases Z, Y, and X
Figure 6: Two scenarios for phased-mission systems with variable configuration
is addressed by providing an efficient mapping procedure at the transition time from a phase to another
phase. While analyzing a phase, only the states relevant to that phase, are considered. Thus each individual
Markov chain is much smaller than in Smotherman and Zemoudeh [9]. For example, in Figure 5, three Markov
chains with number of states 2, 4, and 8, respectively are solved instead of a single Markov chain with 12
states. Using this approach, the computation time for large systems can be reduced significantly without
compromising accuracy. Phases may be of a fixed or a random duration. The reliability (or unreliability)
of the system can be computed from the output of final phase. Furthermore, the technique is sufficiently
general.
Using a similar approach, Dugan [8] suggested another method in which a single Markov chain with state
space equal to the union of the state spaces of the individual phases is generated. The transitions rates are
parameterized with phase numbers and the Markov chain is solved p times for p phases. The final state
occupation probabilities of one phase become the initial state occupation probabilities for the next phase.
In her approach, once a state is declared a system down state in a phase, it cannot become an up state in
a later phase. This is a potential problem as it is possible for a system to have some states that are failure
states in a phase but are up states in a later phase. For example, consider the two scenarios as shown in
Figure 6. In the first case (Figure 6a), phase order is Phase X, Phase Y, and Phase Z. In this case, some of
the states are failure states in the first phase that are later on treated as forced failure states although they
are not failure states in phases 2 and 3. Such states are marked as F(1,2',3') or F(1,2,3'). In the second case,
phase order is Phase Z, Phase Y, and Phase X. In this case, there are no forced failure states.
In this paper, we present a methodology to analyze and solve phased-mission systems in which failure
rates, configuration and success criteria can vary from phase to phase. Moreover, the success criteria can
be specified using fault trees or an equivalent representation. We believe that a majority of systems can be
represented using fault trees. Our approach is similar to Esary and Ziehms' in that we do not generate any
Markov chains, but in addition we do not create a single, monolithic model. We handle one phase at a time
and then compute the overall unreliability of the entire mission. This gives us a computational advantage.
Firstwedescribesomeconcepts which we will use throughout the paper.
3 Distribution Functions with Mass at Origin
One of the key concepts we will use in our method is that of cumulative distribution functions with a mass
at the origin. Consider a random variable X with cumulative distribution function given by
Fx(t) = (1 - e -ar_) + e-aT'(1 -- e-At).
This function has a mass at the origin given by P(X = 0) = (1 - e-AT') . The second term represents the
continuous part of the distribution function.
In order to illustrate the use of such a CDF, consider a component with a failure rate of A that is used
in a phased mission system. Assume that the system has just completed one phase of duration T1 and is
currently in the second phase. The above CDF can be assigned as the failure probability distribution of
the component in the second phase. The first term in the above expression represents the probability that
the component has already failed in the previous phase. The second term represents the failure probability
distribution for this component for the second phase. The time origin for the second phase is reinitialized
to the beginning of the phase. We will use such distribution functions to represent failure probabilities of
individual components during different phases.
4 Phased-Mission Analysis: Phase Independent Success Criteria
In this section we consider a simpler scenario, a phased-mission system in which the success criterion is phase
independent. Therefore, the system configuration and the success criteria remains unchanged from phase to
phase and can be represented by the same fault tree for all phases. However, component failure rates are
allowed to be phase dependent. We first assume that phase durations are deterministic. We will relax these
constraints one at a time in the following subsections.
4.1 Phase-Dependent Failure Rates
To account for phase-dependent failure rates, we assign a failure distribution with mass at the origin to each
component. Let $ji represent the failure rate of component j in phase i. For component j, the distribution
function assigned in phase k is given by
Fc_,_(t) = (1 - e- E_-: a,,T,) + e- EL-: a,,T,(1 _ e-a_*t). (1)
Here time t is measured from the beginning of phase k so that 0 < t < Tk. T/ represents the duration for
phase i. This expression can be simplified to: Fc,.k(t) = 1 -- e-aikt[e - _h=-: _j,T,]. At the end of phase k,
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at t = Tin, the above expression gives the mass at the origin for phase k + 1. A component fails during a
phase only if it survives during all the previous phases. The factor enclosed in square brackets above is the
probability of success during first k - 1 phases. Since the success criteria is same in all phases, a system fails
by phase k if it fails any time during the first k phases. We can obtain the unreliability of the system at
time 0 < t < Tk during phase 1 < k < m by evaluating the fault tree using the failure distribution function
for each component as given by Fcj._(t). Of course, if our only interest is in the failure probability for the
entire mission, we evaluate the fault tree assigning a constant faliure probability
1 - e- _i--_ xj,T,
to component j .
4.2 Age-Dependent Failure Rates
If the failure rates of components are phase and age dependent then we cannot count time for each phase
independently. Instead, to compute the failure probability distribution, we have to account for the global
(mission) time and its affect on each component. This can be achieved by assigning the failure distribution
function for component j in phase k as follows.
Here,
i
CT_ = _-'_ Tt
/=1
is the sum of durations for i phases and CTo = O. The time t is the cumulative time and is not reset to zero
for the next phase. Instead it starts at t = 0 at the beginning of a mission and continues to increase. With
this modification, the fault tree can be evaluated for any time 0 < t < CTm. The probability of failure of
component Cj at the end of the mission is given by
1 - e- _2' f:_'-' xj,(t)dt
Using this constant failure probability for component Cj (for all j), the fault tree can be evaluated to
obtain the mission failure probability.
4.3 Random Phase Durations
To account for random phase durations, we use conditioning followed by the theorem of total probability.
Let FT,(ti) be the distribution function for the length of phase i. These distributions are specified by the
user.Conditioningonthedurationsof phasesT1 = tl,T2 = t2,... ,T,_ =tm the mission failure probability
for component j is given by
Then the unconditional faliure probability for component j is given by
where F_,(s)is the LST (Laplace Stieltejs transform) of 7_ so that F_q(s) = fo e-'"dFT.(t,)
This failure probability can be assigned to component Cj (for all j) and the fault tree can be evaluated
to compute the unreliability of the system for the whole mission consisting of m phases.
5 Phased-Mission Analysis: Phase-Dependent Success Criteria
The results of the previous section apply to the cases when the success criteria does not change from phase
to phase. However, in many applications, the success criteria and the system configuration may change from
phase to phase. There are several reasons for reconfiguration and change in success criteria from phase to
phase. Some of these are discussed below.
1. A component is used in all phases but its operational level requirements may change. In this case, no
special treatment is required for this component. The definition of operation or failed state depends
on the success criteria.
2. A component is used in a n consecutive phases starting with some phase k, and is then not needed for
system operation in the remaining phases.
3. A component is required to remain operational for some phase, is not need for the operation of a few
phases and is then required again for system operation.
4. Additional redundant modules are added during the operation of the system.
5. Some redundant modules are removed from a subsystem.
6. Spare or operational redundant modules corresponding to one subsystem become spare or redundant
modules for another subsystem.
Due to a change in success criterion, it is possible that some combination of failures of components in
one phase leads to failure of the system whereas the same combination does not lead to failure in some other
phase. |n Markov chain-based methods, it is easier to keep track of the system states, and therefore, change
in system success criteria could be easily accounted for. However, in the case of a fault tree, this change
needsto be accounted for by considering cases when the system may fail or may not fail at the time of phase
transition. There are four possible cases which may occur at the time of a phase transition from phase i to
phase i + 1.
1. A combination of component failures does not lead to system failure in both phases i and i + 1.
2. A combination of component failures leads to system failure in both phases i and i + 1.
3. A combination of component failures does not imply system failure in phase i but is treated as system
failure in phase i + 1.
4. A combination of component failures implies system failure in phase i but does not imply system failure
in phase i + 1.
The first two cases require treatment similar to that in the previous section as the success criteria does
not change from phase i to phase i + 1 with respect to the failure combination under consideration. Failure
combinations in the third case above should be treated as failures in the earlier phase i as well. This is
because such combinations, once present during a phase are bound to lead to the system failure eventually
at the transition time when the systems enters this later phase. These are referred to as latent failures in
Ill]. Hence a more stringent criterion should be applied with respect to these combinations. So we can
assume that all failure combinations in phase i + 1 are also failure combinations in phase i (but not vice
versa). Hence for the first three cases, the unreliability can be evaluated by evaluating the fault tree for the
last phase using the approach of Section 4.
The failure combinations which imply system failure in phase i, but do not lead to system failure in
subsequent phases, as is the fourth case, should be handled more carefully. We need to account for the
probability of occurrence of these failure combinations until phase i. Any probability attributed to such
combinations of component failures in later phases does not contribute towards system unreliability. Esary
and Ziehms account for this by cascading the phase reliability blocks. However, as mentioned earlier, that
leads to a more expensive computation. We present our method of handling such failure combinations below.
Our methodology consists of the following steps. We divide the system unreliability of a phased mission
system into two parts: (i) common failure combinations; and (ii) phase failure combinations. We evaluate
the unreliability due to these two components using the following procedure.
5.1 Common Failure Combinations
The first component, common failure combinations, includes the probability of those component failure
combinations which are common to all phases after the most stringent criterion has been applied to all phases.
That is, if a combination leads to system failure in phase i+ l, then it is a considered a failure combination in
phasei as well. Thus the common failure combinations essentially include the failure combination specified
for the last phase.
The unreliability due to common failure combinations can be computed using the method described in
the previous section for analyzing phased-mission system with phase-independent success criteria. That is,
we compute the failure probability distribution for individual component and then evaluate the common
fault tree which is the fault tree for the last phase.
5.2 Phase Failure Combinations
The second component, phase failure combination, includes the probability of all failures specific to individual
phases after applying the most stringent success criterion in each phase. For phase i, this part include the
probability of only those component failure combinations which contribute to system failure in phase i but
are considered operational in all subsequent phases.
Unreliability due to the second component requires additional computations. For each phase, we need to
identify and compute the probability of component failure combinations which lead to system failure in that
phase and does not imply system failure in any subsequent phase. Let Ei be the Boolean logic expression
specifying the failure combinations for phase i. Then phase failure combinations for phase i (PFCi), which
are treated as success combinations for the all subsequent phases are given by
PFCi = (.. "((Ei A Ei+l) A E--_+2)... A E-_).
In the above expression, we include only those combinations which are failure combinations in phase i but
are not failure combinations in any of the subsequent phases. This expression can be simplified as
PFCi = Ei A (Ei+l V...V Ep).
5.3 Phase Algebra
Let A = 1 mean that component A has failed. Then A = 0 says that component A has failed and A = 1
means that component A is operational. Using this notation, for the system described in Figure 2 the
following Boolean expression describe the failure combinations for phases X, Y, and Z.
Ex =A+B+C
Ey=A+BC
Ez=ABC
It should be noted that in the expression for PFCi, event A denotes the failure of component A in phase
i only. Thus for each phase, we need to define a separate symbol for each component. This is very similar
to Esary and Ziehms notation where they have a separate symbol denoting failure of a component in each
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phase.LetAi = 1 denote the event that component A is'operational during the interval from the start of
the mission until the end of phase i. This automatically implies that the component is operational during
all earlier phases as well. With this addition, the Boolean expressions for phases X, Y, and Z used in system
phase i are denoted by Eix, Eiy, and Eiz, respectively, and are given by the following.
Eix = Ai + Bi + Ci
Eiy = Ai + Bi Ci
Eiz = Ai Bi Ci
When the expression for PFCi is simplified, we need to merge different combinations of such terms which
could be a little tricky and need special treatment. Let i and j be two phases and let i < j. The following
rules should be used to simplify the logic expressions.
Ai Aj _ Aj Ai + Aj --* Aj
Ai Aj --* A--_ Ai + Aj --* Ai
A--_"Aj _ 0 Ai + Aj --* i
(2)
AiA'--j and A--_+ Aj do not simplify any further. What the first combination means is that component A is
operational until the end of phase i and then fails sometime between the end of phase i and end of phase j.
The second term has no physical meaning. Also, if a component fails during a phase and then it is required
to be operational during a later phase, then the two events cannot be satisfied at the same time. That is
why AiAj _ 0 holds.
The correctness of these relations can be verified by considering the following. Let ai = 1 denote that
the component A is operational during phase i only. Then Ai = ala2...ai and Aj = ala2""aj. Now by
substituting these values on both sides of each of these relations, we can verify that Relations 2 hold.
5.4 System Unreliability
Using the phase algebra, the system unreliability can be computed as follows. First compute all the PFCi's
for all phases. Then the system unreliability is given by
p-1
UR = P(Ep) + E P(PrCi) (3)
i=1
where P(Ep) is the probability of failure evaluated using the fault tree, Ep of phase p (the last phase) using
the failure distribution function calculated for each component as described in Section 3. P(PFCi) is the
probability of phase failure combinations for phase i. To calculate PFCi's, we will require probability of
events such as a component remains operational during all phases starting from 1 to i, or a component
remains operational during phase 1 to phase k and then fails during phase k + 1 to phase i for some k. Such
probabilities can also be calculated using the techniques defined in Section 3.
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5.5 Example
In this section, we demonstrate our technique using the example described in Figure 2. This system has
three components and we describe three phases, X, Y, and Z. To show the difference, we will consider all
the six permutations of three phases. The failure combinations of three phases are defined by Ex, Ey, and
Ez above.
Now we discuss each of the six permutations separately.
Permutation X Y Z. In this case first phase is phase X, followed by phase Y, that is followed by phase
Z. So the PFCi functions are obtained as follows.
PFCI = (Elx • E2v)" Esz
• = ((A, + B1 + Cl).(A2 + B2 C_)).(-_3 Ba Ca)
= A3B2Cl + AaB1C_. + A2B3C1 + A_BICa
m
PFC2 = Ey.Ez
= (A2 + B2 C2).(A3 Ba C3)
= A3B2 C2 + A2B3 + A2C3
Then the system unreliability is given by
URxyz
where
P(Eaz)
P(PFCI)
and
P(PFC2)
= P(E3z) + P(PFC1) + P(PFC2)
= P(AaB2C1)
: P(A3B2CI)
: P(A3B2C1)
= P(AaB2C1)
= P(AaB_Ct)
= P(A3B2C1)
P(Aa)- P(B3) • P(C3)
P(A3B2C1 + AaBIC2 + A2B3C1 + A2B1C3)
+ P((A3B1C2 + A2B3C1 + A2B1C3) • (A3 + B2 + C1))
+ P(A3BIC2 + A2AaB3CI + A2B1C3)
+ P(A3BIC2) + P((A2A3B3C, + A2B---(C3). ("_3 + B1 +-C_2))
+ P(AaB1C2) + P(A2A3BaC1 + A2A3 BICa)
+ P(A3B1 C2) + P(A2AaBaCI) + P((A2A3 B1 C3). (A---2+ A3 Jr "_3 + C1 ))
+ P(A3BIC2)+ P(A2A3B3C1) + P(A2A3 BIC3)
= P(A3B2 C_ + A-_B3 + A_C3)
= P(A3B2 C2) + P((A2B3 + A2C3)" (A3 + B2 + C2))
= P(A3B2 C2) + P(A2B3 + A2C3)
= P(A3B2 C_) + P(A_B3) + P((A2Ca)" (As + U3))
= P(A3B2 C2) + P(A2B3) + P(A2B3C3)
(4)
(5)
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It iseasyto computetheprobabilityof failurein phase3 using the failure distributions for individual
components. A fault tree solver such as SHARPE [2] can be used to compute that. Similarly, the probability
of expressions in Equation 4 can be evaluated after simplifying the expressions as a sum of disjoint products
using algorithm such as the one described in [12] and depicted in 5.
Permutation X Z Y. In this case first phase is phase X, followed by phase Z, that is followed by phase
Y. Without going into details, the PFCi functions are computed as follows.
and
m
PFC1 = A3B3CI -4-A3B1C3
PFC2 = ¢
The last phase in this case is phase Y. The system unreliability can be computed using
VRxzy = P(E3y) + P(PrC1) + P(PFC2)
= P(A-_) + P(A3B3 C3) + P(A3B3C"--O + P(A3B-TC3).
Permutation Y X Z. For this case, the PFCi functions are computed as follows.
and
PFC1 = ¢
PFC2 = A3(B2 + C2) + B3(A2 + C2) + C3(A2 + B2)
The last phase in this case is phase Z. The system unreliability can be computed using the following. (We
are omitting details of simplification.)
URyxz = P(E3z) + P(PFC1) + P(PFC2)
= P(A""3). P(-_3)" P(-C3) + P(A3B""2) + P(A3B2C-"_) + P(T2B3)
+P(A2 B3C3) + P(A2A3B3C2) + P(A_A3 B2C3)
Pernmtation Y Z X. For this case, the PFCi functions are computed as follows.
PFCI = ¢
and
PFC2 = ¢
The last phase in this case is phase X. The system unreliability can be computed using the following.
URyzx = P(E3x) + P(PFC1)+ P(PFC2)
= P(A--_) + P(B--_) + P(-_3)
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Permutation Z X Y.
and
For this case, the PFCi functions are computed as follows.
PFC1 = ¢
m m
PFC2 = AaB3C2 + A3B2Ca
The last phase in this case is phase Y. The system unreliability can be computed using the following.
URzxy = P(Eay) + P(PFCz) + P(PFC2)
= P(-_3) + P(A3-_3 -_3) + P(A3B3C---_ + P(A3-B'_C3)
Permutation Z Y X.
and
For this case, the PFCi functions are computed as follows.
PFCz = ¢
PFC2 = ¢
The last phase in this case is phase X. The system unreliability can be computed using the following.
URyzx = P(E3x) + P(PFC1) + P(PFC2)
= P(A3) + P(B3) + P(C3)
5.6 Exact Solution Using Markov Chain
The same three component system can be analyzed using Markov Chain for the six permutations. There
are eight possible states in each phase as depicted in Figure 3. Using the same notation for the names of
states, i.e., state 101 represents that components A and C are operational and component B has failed, we
can derive expressions for states occupacncy probabilities (SOPs) at the end of each phase. Depending on
the success criteria, for the failure states in phase p, the initial state occupancy probability for the same
state in phase p + 1 is zero.
Let Pp(s) denote the SOP for phase p of state s where s E {000, 001, 010, 011,100,101,110, 111} and
p = l, 2, and 3. Again, let Tp denote the phase duration for phase p and let CTp denote the sum of
durations of first p phases. Let hA,, $B,, and _cp denote the failure rates of components A, B, and C,
respectively, in phase p. Using these notations, the SOPs for phase p can be derived using the SOPs for
phase p- 1 and are given in Equation 6.
Using the relationship in Equation 6, we can compute the SOPs for operational states for each phase.
The unreliability at the end of each phase is given by 1 - sum of SOPs of operational states in that phase.
At the end of that phase, SOP for the failure states in that phase can be set to zero as this probability mass
is not carried forward to the next phase to success states. For example, for the case of permutation X Y Z,
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initiallyP0(s) = 0.0 for all states where s # 111 and P0011) = 1.0. Using these values and the success criteria
for phase X, at the end of phase X, we assign PI(,)(CT1) = 0.0 for all states where s # 111 and PIO1u(CT1)
is calculated Equation 6. Using, these values and the success criteria of phase Y, we can compute SOPs for
phase 2. At the beginning of phase 3, we assign P2(s)(CT2) = 0.0 where s E {000,001,010,011,100} and
compute P_(s)(CT2) = 0.0 where s E {101,110,111} using relations defined in Equation 6. Finally, using
these results of phase 2, we can calculate PzO)(CT3) where s E {001,010,011,100, 101,110,111}.
Sometimes a backward or need-based computation may be more useful. For example, for permutation
Z Y X, we only need to calculate P3(l_l)(CT3) which requires only P2011)(CT2). This, in turn, requires
computation of P_O_I)(CT_) which can be calculated using PoO1U(CTo) = 1.0. Finally, the unreliability for
the 3 phase system is 1 - P3(lu)(CT3). However, intermediate unreliabiities at the end of phases 1 and 2
may require more computation.
Pp(lll)(CTp_l -Ji- _)
Pp( l lO)( CTp_ l -.}- t)
ep(_01)(CTp-1 + t)
Pp(o,_)(CT__, + t)
PpOoo)(CTp-, + t)
Pp(olo)(CTp-, + t)
Pp(oo_)(CTp-1+ t)
= Pp_l(lll)(CTp_l)e-AA,t e-ABpt e-._c,;t
= Pp_I(lll)(CTp_I)e-A"_, t 6.-AB't (1-- e-At. t) -t-Pp-l(,,o)(CTp-1)e-xA'¢ e-AB't
= Pp_,(,,1)(CTp_,)e-X'%`(1- e-'xB_'')e-xc,` + Pp-KlOl)(CTp-1)e-xA'' e-'Xc't
= Pp_K,,,)(CTp_,)(1 - e-Xa_.`) e-XB,t e-Xc,t + Pp_I(Olu(CT.-,)e -Astt e-XC,'
= Pp_Kllu(CT,_1)e-X'%t (1 - e-x',t) (1 - e-'xc,t) + Pp_lOoo)(CTp-1)e-'x'%t
+P._l(llo)(CTp_i)e-Xa. ' (1 - e-X'3,t) + P._l(lOl)(CT.-1)e -xa'' (1 - e-XC. ')
= Pp-l(111)(CTp-1)(1-- e-'xA't) e-x"'t (1 -- e-XC,`) + Pp-l(Olo)(crp-1)e -x"'t
+Pp-,O1o)(CTp-,)(l- e-xA'`)e-x"''+ Pp-I(OIu(CTp-,)e-x'''(I- e-XC,`)
= Pp_,(,,I)(CTp-,)(Ie-x'%t)(I- e-x",')e-_c,'+ Pp-l(Oou(CTp-1)exc't
+Pp_,(,ol)(CTp-,)(1 - e-AA'') e-xc'` + Pp_l(Ol,)(CTp-1)(1- e-xB't) e-XC"
(6)
5.7 Comparison with Other Techniques
We analyze the above six scenarios using the technique discussed in this paper, Esary and Ziehms approach,
analytic solution of Markov chains, phased-mission approach of [10] and [9], and the phased-mission approach
of [8]. We assume that the durations of all the three phases are 10 hours each and the failure rate of each of
the component is 0.0001/hour. Thus the input data do not skew results in any direction as all components
are similar and all phases are similar. The results are only affected by the sequencing of phases and system
success criteria.
We obtain the results shown in Tables 1 and 2. The results for the six permutations of phases X, Y, and
Z, are obtained (and listed) at the end of each phase. When the worst case criteria is applied, that is a failed
state in one phase is considered as failed state in all subsequent phases, the results for unreliability can be
very high.
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Table1:UnreliabilityofPhased-MissionSystem(AccurateAnalysis)
Permute XYZ XZ Y YXZ YZX ZXY ZYX
Phase1 0.0029955040.0029955040.0010004980.0010004980.0000000010.000000001
Phase2 0.0039930060.0029955050.0059820360.0010005020.0059820360.002001985
Phase3 0.0039930090.0049914930.0059820370.0089596210.0069765490.008959621
Table2: Unreliabilityof Phased-MissionSystem(WorstCaseScenario'
Permute XYZ XZ Y YXZ YZX ZXY ZYX
Phase1 0.0029955040.0029955040.0010004980.0010004980.0000000010.000000001
Phase2 0.0059820360.0059820360.0059820360.0020019850.0059820360.002001985
Phase3 0.0089596210.0089596210.0089596210.0089596210.0089596210.008959621
Theimportanthingto observehereis that when we allow failure combinations (failure states in Markov
chains) to become operational combinations (up states in Markov chains) in a later phase, then the overall
unreliability of the system can be substantially lower, as is the case in the last column. For example, in
a spacecraft, launch is the most important activity. After that, all launch related activities or components
which could have caused failure during launch is not going to make any difference any more. Thus those
failure combinations are operational combinations for the rest of the mission.
To further explore the impact of phase configurations and durations of phases, we varied the phase
durations. In the first variation, we assume that the first phase is always of 1 hour duration, the second
phase is of l0 hour duration, and the third phase is of 100 hour duration irrespective of the types of phase
configurations, X, Y, or Z, used during these phases. The results for this variation for the two cases are shown
in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. In another variation, we assume that the phase X is always of I hour duration,
phase Y is always of l0 hours duration, and phase Z is always of 100 hours duration irrespective of where in
the mission these phase configurations are used. The results are given in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. In this
case, the results differ by more than an order of magnitude depending on the ordering of the phases. If the
stringest success criteria is during the beginning of phases, then phased-mission analysis is more meaningful.
It should be noted that the techniques in [10], [8], and [9] are capable of handling the more general case
of repairable systems while the technique discussed by Esary and Ziehms as well as the one presented in this
paper are both restricted to the cases of non-repairable systems. The technique in [9] is most general but
most expensive in computation time and in this case will yield the same result as in [10] because both of
these make no approximations.
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Table3: Unreliabilitywith1,10,and100hoursphases(AccurateAnalysis)
Permute
Phase1
XYZ
0.000299955
XZY
0.000299955
YXZ
0.000100005
YZX
0.000100005
ZXY
0.000000000
ZYX
0.000000000
Phase 2 0.001300153 0.000299956 0.003294561 0.000100006 0.003294561 0.001100603
Phase 3 0.001301332 0.011354728 0.003295543 0.032751658 0.013309644 0.032751658
Table 4: Unreliability with 1, 10, and 100 hours phases (Worst Case Scenario)
Permute XYZ XZY YXZ YZX ZXY ZYX
Phase 1 0.000299955 0.000299955 0.000100005 0.000100005 0.000000000 0.000000000
Phase 2 0.003294561 0.003294561
Phase 3 0.032751658 0.032751658
0.003294561 0.000200020
0.032751658 0.032751658
0.003294561
0.032751658
0.001100603
0.032751658
6 Conclusions
We have presented a technique to analyze phased-mission systems using fault trees. This technique yields
accurate results and is simpler in concept and computation. For this purpose, we develop a phase algebra
that allows us to efficiently compute the probability of all possible combinations contributing to failure in
phased-mission systems during individual phases. This technique will be very useful for a large class of
systems where the system behavior can be described using fault trees.
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